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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) has progressed rapidly dur-
ing the past decade and the major factor that drives such
development is the unprecedented large-scale data. As data
generation is a continuous process, this leads to ML service
providers updating their models frequently with newly-collected
data in an online learning scenario. In consequence, if an ML
model is queried with the same set of data samples at two
different points in time, it will provide different results.
In this paper, we investigate whether the change in the output
of a black-box ML model before and after being updated can
leak information of the dataset used to perform the update. This
constitutes a new attack surface against black-box ML models
and such information leakage severely damages the intellectual
property and data privacy of the ML model owner/provider. In
contrast to membership inference attacks, we use an encoder-
decoder formulation that allows inferring diverse information
ranging from detailed characteristics to full reconstruction of
the dataset. Our new attacks are facilitated by state-of-the-art
deep learning techniques. In particular, we propose a hybrid gen-
erative model (BM-GAN) that is based on generative adversarial
networks (GANs) but includes a reconstructive loss that allows
generating accurate samples. Our experiments show effective
prediction of dataset characteristics and even full reconstruction
in challenging conditions.
Index Terms—Machine Learning Security and Privacy, Dataset
Reconstruction Attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has progressed rapidly during the
past decade. Nowadays, it has become the core component in
many industrial domains ranging from automotive manufactur-
ing to financial services. Leading Internet companies, such as
Google,1 Amazon,2 and Microsoft,3 further provide Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS) to simplify ML deployment.
In this setting, an MLaaS provider trains a machine learning
model at their backend and provides the trained model to
public as a black-box API.
The major factor that drives the current ML development is
the unprecedented large-scale data. In consequence, collecting
high-quality data becomes essential for building advanced ML
models. Data collection is a continuous process as enormous
data is being generated at every second. This turns ML model
training into a continuous process as well: Instead of training
an ML model for once and keeping on using it afterwards, the




updating the model with newly-collected data. In practice, this
is also known as online learning. And we refer to the dataset
used to perform model update as the updating set.
Regularly updating an ML model results in the model
having different versions with respect to different model
parameters. This indicates that if an ML model is queried with
the same set of data samples at two different points in time,
it will provide different outputs.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, our main research question is: Can different
outputs of an ML model’s two versions queried with the same
set of data samples leak information of the corresponding
updating set?. This constitutes a new attack surface against
machine learning models. Information leakage of the updating
set can severely damage the intellectual property and data
privacy of the model provider/owner.
We concentrate on the most common ML application –
classification. More importantly, we target on black-box ML
models – the most difficult attack setting where an adversary
does not have access to her target model’s parameters but can
only query the model with her data samples and obtain the
corresponding prediction results, i.e., posteriors in the case of
classification.
In total, we propose four different attacks in this surface
which can be categorized into two classes, namely, single-
sample attack class and multi-sample attack class. The two
attacks in the single-sample attack class concentrate on a
simplified case when the target ML model is updated with
one single data sample. We investigate this case to show
whether an ML model’s two versions’ different outputs indeed
constitute a valid attack surface. The two attacks in the multi-
sample attack class tackle a more general and complex case
when the updating set contains multiple data samples.
Among our four attacks, two (one for each attack class) aim
at reconstructing the updating set which to our knowledge,
are the first attempt in this direction. Compared to many
previous attacks inferring certain properties of a target model’s
training set [6], [8], [13], dataset reconstruction attack leads
to more severe consequences [20]. In theory, membership
inference attacks [19], [29], [31] can also be leveraged to
reconstruct the dataset from a black-box ML model. However,
membership inference is not scalable in the real-world setting
as the adversary needs to collect a large data sample which



















model. Though our two reconstruction attacks are designed
specifically for the online learning setting, we believe they
can provide further insights on reconstructing a black-box ML
model’s training set in other settings.
Extensive experiments show that indeed, the output differ-
ence of the same ML model’s two different versions can be
exploited to infer information about the updating set. We detail
our contributions as the following.
General Attack Construction. Our four attacks follow a
general structure, which can be formulated into an encoder-
decoder style. The encoder realized by a multilayer perceptron
(MLP) takes the difference of the target ML model’s outputs,
namely posterior difference, as its input while the decoder
produces different types of information about the updating set
with respect to different attacks.
To obtain the posterior difference, we randomly select a
fixed set of data samples, referred to as the probing set, and
probe the target model’s two different versions (the second-
version model is obtained by updating the first-version model
with an updating set). Then, we calculate the difference
between the two sets of posteriors as the input for our attack’s
encoder.
Single-sample Attack Class. The single-sample attack class
contains two attacks: Single-sample label inference attack and
single-sample reconstruction attack. The first attack predicts
the label of the single sample used to update the target model.
We realize the corresponding decoder for the attack by a
two-layer MLP. Our evaluation shows that our attack is able
to achieve a strong performance, e.g., 0.96 accuracy on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.4
The single-sample reconstruction attack aims at reconstruct-
ing the updating sample. We rely on autoencoder (AE). In
detail, we first train an AE on a different set of data samples.
Then, we transfer the AE’s decoder into our attack model as
its sample reconstructor. Experimental results show that we
can construct the single sample with a mean squared error
(MSE) of 0.06355 for the MNIST dataset5 and 0.01352 for
the CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively. Moreover, we show that
our attack learns to generate the specific sample used in the
updating set [20], [31] instead of a general representation of
samples affiliated with the same label.
Multi-sample Attack Class. The multi-sample attack class
includes multi-sample label distribution estimation attack and
multiple-sample reconstruction attack. Multi-sample label dis-
tribution estimation attack estimates the label distribution of
the updating set’s data samples. It is a generalization of the
label inference attack in the single-sample attack class. We
realize this attack by setting up the attack model’s decoder
as a multilayer perceptron with a fully connected layer and
a softmax layer. Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence)
is adopted as the model’s loss function. Extensive experiments
demonstrate the effecitiveness of this attack. For the CIFAR-10
4https://www.cs.toronto.edu/∼kriz/cifar.html
5http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
dataset, when the updating set’s cardinality is 100, our attack
model achieves a 0.00376 KL-divergence which outperforms
the baseline model by a factor of 3. Moreover, the accuracy
of predicting the most frequent label is 0.32 which is also 3
times higher than the baseline model.
Our last attack, namely multiple-sample reconstruction at-
tack, aims at generating all samples in the updating set. This
is a much more complex attack than the previous ones. The
decoder for this attack is assembled with two components.
The first one learns the data distribution of the updating set
samples. To this end, we propose a novel hybrid generative
model, namely BM-GAN. Different from the standard gener-
ative adversarial networks (GANs), our BM-GAN introduces
a “Best Match” loss which ensures that each sample in the
updating set is reconstructed. The second component of our
decoder relies on machine learning clustering to group the
generated data samples by BM-GAN into clusters and take
the central sample of each cluster as one final reconstructed
sample. Our evaluation shows that we are able to reconstruct
very similar samples as those in the original updating set on
both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper:
• We discover a new attack surface against black-box ML
models, i.e., different outputs of the same ML model’s
two versions queried with a same set of data samples.
• We propose four different attacks in this surface based
on advanced machine learning techniques. Extensive ex-
periments demonstrate that the updating set’s information
can be effectively inferred.
• Two of our attacks aim at reconstructing the updating set
itself. Though designed for our specific attack surface,
we believe they can provide further insights on dataset
reconstruction attacks in other settings.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide
necessary preliminaries in Section II. In Section III, we in-
troduce our general attack pipeline. Section IV and Section V
present our attacks and their evaluation results in single-sample
and multi-sample attack classes, respectively. In Section VI,
we discuss possible defense mechanisms. Section VII presents
the related work in the field and Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we start by introducing online learning, then
present our threat model, and finally introduce the datasets
used in our experiments.
A. Online Learning
In this paper, we focus on the most common machine learn-
ing task – classification. An ML classifier M is essentially
a function that maps a data sample x ∈ X to posterior
probabilities y ∈ Y .




M A machine learning model




x A data sample
xupdate A data sample used to update the model
δ Posterior difference
µ Latent vector learned by attack model’s encoder
` Probability vector of xupdate affiliated with a certain label
q Probability vector of Dupdate ’s samples’ label distribution
Here, y ∈ Y is a vector with each entry indicating the
probability of x being classified to a certain class or affiliated
with a certain label. The sum of all values in y is 1. To train
an ML model, we need a set of data samples, i.e., training
set. The training process is performed by a certain optimiza-
tion algorithm, such as ADAM, following a predefined loss
function.
A trained ML model M can be updated with an updating
set denoted by Dupdate . The model update is performed by
further training the model with the updating set using the same
optimization algorithm on the basis of the current model’s
parameters. More formally, given an updating set Dupdate and
a trained ML model M, the updating process Fupdate can be
defined as the following:
Fupdate : Dupdate ,M→M′
where M′ is the updated version of M. For presentation
purposes, we summarize the notations used throughout the
paper in Table I.
B. Threat Model
For all of our four attacks, we consider an adversary with
black-box access to the target ML model. This means that
the adversary can only query the model with a set of data
samples, i.e., her probing set, and obtain the corresponding
posteriors. This follows the typical setting of MLaaS, which
is also the most difficult attack setting for the adversary [31].
We also assume that the adversary has a local dataset which
comes from the same distribution as the target model’s train-
ing set following previous works [8], [29], [31]. Moreover,
we consider the adversary to be able to establish the same
ML model as the target ML model with respect to model
architecture. This can be achieved by using the same MLaaS
which constructs the target model [31] or performing model
hyperparameter stealing attacks [24], [38]. The adversary
needs these two information to establish a shadow model
which mimics the behavior of the target model to derive data
for training her attack model (see Section III-D). Also, part of
the adversary’s local dataset will be used as her probing set.
C. Datasets Description
For our experimental evaluation, we use two well-known
image datasets including MNIST and CIFAR-10. Both of them
are benchmark datasets for various computer vision as well as
machine learning security and privacy tasks. MNIST is a 10-
class image dataset, it consists of 70,000 28×28 grey-scale
images. Each image contains in its center a handwritten digit.
Images in MNIST are equally distributed over 10 classes, i.e.,
7,000 images per class. CIFAR-10 contains 60,000 32×32
color images. It also contains 10 classes including airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck.
Similar to MNIST, CIFAR-10 is also a balanced dataset.
III. GENERAL ATTACK PIPELINE
Our general attack pipeline can be divided into three phases.
In the first phase, the adversary generates her attack input,
i.e., posterior difference. In the second phase, our encoder
transforms the posterior difference into a latent vector. In the
last phase, the decoder decodes the latent vector to produce
different information of the updating set with respect to
different attacks. Figure 1 provides a schematic view of our
attack pipeline.
In this section, we provide a general introduction for each
phase of our attack pipeline. In the end, we present our strategy
of deriving data to train our attack models.
A. Attack Input
Recall that we aim at investigating the information leaked
from posterior difference of a model’s two versions when
queried with the same set of data samples. To create this
posterior difference, the adversary first needs to pick a set
of data samples as her probing set, denoted by Dprobe . In
this work, the adversary picks a random sample of data
points (from her local dataset) to form Dprobe . Choosing or
crafting [24] a specific set of data samples as the probing
set may further improve attack efficiency, we leave this as
a future work. Next, the adversary queries the target ML
model M with all samples in Dprobe and concatenates the
received outputs to form a vector yprobe . Then, she probes
the updated model M′ with samples in Dprobe and creates a
vector y′probe accordingly. In the end, she sets the posterior
difference, denoted by δ, to the difference of both outputs:
δ = yprobe − y′probe
Note that the dimension of δ is the product of Dprobe ’s
cardinality and the number of classes of the target dataset. For
this paper, both CIFAR-10 and MNIST are 10-class datasets,
and our probing set always contains 100 data samples, this
indicates the dimension of δ is 1,000.
B. Encoder Design
All our attacks share the same encoder structure, we model
it with a multilayer perceptron. The number of layers inside
the encoder depends on the dimension of δ: Longer δ requires
more layers in the encoder. As our δ is always a 1,000-
dimension vector, we use two fully connected layers in the
encoder. The first layer transforms δ to a 128-dimension vector
and the second layer further reduces the dimension to 64. The












where FullyConnected(128) denotes a fully connected
layer with 128 hidden units and µ denotes the latent vector
which serves as the input for our decoder. Furthermore, we
use LeakyReLU as our encoder’s activation function and apply
dropout on both layers for regularization.
C. Decoder Structure
Our four attacks aim at inferring different information of
the updating set Dupdate , ranging from sample labels to the
updating set itself. Thus, we construct different decoders for
different attacks with different techniques, such as multilayer
perceptron, autoencoder, and generative adversarial networks.
The details of these decoders will be presented in the following
sections.
D. Shadow Model
Our encoder as well as decoder need to be trained jointly in
a supervised manner. This indicates that we need ground truth
data for model training. Due to our minimal assumptions, the
adversary cannot get the ground truth from the target model.
To solve this problem, we rely on shadow model following
previous works [8], [29], [31]. A shadow model is designed
to mimic the target model. By controlling the training process
of the shadow model, the adversary can derive the ground truth
data needed to train her attack models.
As presented in Section II-B, our adversary knows (1) the
architecture of the target model (by using the same MLaaS)
and (2) a local dataset coming from the same distribution
as the target dataset. To build a shadow model Mshadow ,
the adversary first establishes an ML model with the same
structure as the target model. Then, she gets a shadow dataset
Dshadow from her local dataset (the rest is used as Dprobe )
and splits it into two parts: Shadow training set Dtrainshadow and
shadow updating set Dupdateshadow . Dtrainshadow is used to train the
shadow model while Dupdateshadow is further split to m datasets:
Dupdate1shadow · · · Dupdate
m
shadow . The number of samples in each of
the m datasets depends on the attack. For instance, our two
attacks in the single-sample attack class require each dataset
containing a single sample. The adversary then generates m
shadow updated models M′1shadow · · ·M′mshadow by updating
the shadow model Mshadow with m shadow updating sets in
parallel.
The adversary, in the end, probes the shadow and updated
shadow models with her probing set Dprobe , and calculates
the shadow posterior difference δ1shadow · · · δmshadow . Together
with the corresponding shadow updating set’s ground truth
information (depending on the attack), the training data for
her attack model is derived.
More generally, the training set for each of our
attack models contains m samples corresponding to
Dupdate1shadow · · · Dupdate
m
shadow . In all our experiments, we set m to
10,000. In addition, we create 1,000 updated models for the
target model, this means the testing set for each attack model
contains 1,000 samples.
IV. SINGLE-SAMPLE ATTACKS
In this section, we concentrate on the case when an ML
model is updated with a single sample. This is a simplified
attack scenario and we aim at examining the possibility
of using posterior difference to infer information about the
updating set. In Section V, we tackle a more general scenario
when the updating set contains multiple samples.
We start by introducing the single-sample label inference
attack, then, present the single-sample reconstruction attack.
A. Single-sample Label Inference Attack
Attack Definition. Our single-sample label inference attack
takes the posterior difference as the input and outputs the label
of the single updating sample. More formally, given a posterior
4
difference δ, our single-sample label inference attack is defined
as follows:
ALI : δ 7→ `
where ` is a vector with each entry representing the probability
of the updating sample affiliated with a certain label.
Methodology. To recap, the general construction of the attack
model consists of an MLP-based encoder which takes the
posterior difference as its input and outputs a latent vector
µ. For this attack, the adversary constructs her decoder also
with an MLP which is assembled with a fully connected
layer and a softmax layer to transform the latent vector to
the corresponding updating sample’s label. Formally, ALI ’s
decoder is realized with the following structure:
ALI ’s decoder architecture:
µ→ FullyConnected(n)
softmax→ `
where n is equal to the size of `, i.e., n = |`|.
To obtain the data for training the attack model ALI , the
adversary generates ground truth data by creating a shadow
model as introduced in Section III-D while setting the shadow
updating set’s cardinality to 1. Then, the adversary trains her






where `i is the true probability of label i and ˆ`i is our predicted
probability of label i. The optimization is performed by the
ADAM optimizer.
To perform the label inference attack, the adversary con-
structs the posterior difference as introduced in Section III-A,
then feeds it to the attack model ALI to obtain the label.
Experimental Setup. We evaluate the performance of our
single-sample label inference attack using both MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Firstly, we split each dataset into three
disjoint datasets: The target dataset Dtarget , the shadow dataset
Dshadow , and the probing dataset Dprobe . As mentioned be-
fore, Dprobe contains 100 data samples. We then split Dshadow
to Dtrainshadow and Dupdateshadow to train the shadow model as well as
updating it (see Section III-D). The same process is applied to
train and update the target model with Dtarget . As mentioned
in Section III-D, we build 10,000 and 1,000 updated models
for target and shadow models, respectively. This means the
training and testing sets for our attack model contain 10,000
and 1,000 samples, respectively.
We use convolutional neural network (CNN) to build
shadow and target models for both CIFAR-10 and MNIST
datasets. The CIFAR-10 model consists of two convolutional
layers, one max pooling layer, three fully connected layers,
and a softmax layer. The MNIST model consists of two















Fig. 2: [Higher is better] Performance of the single-sample
label inference attack (ALI ) on both MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets together with the baseline model. Accuracy is adopted
the as the evaluation metric.
All shadow and target models’ training sets contain 10,000
images. We train the CIFAR-10 and MNIST models for 50
and 25 epochs, respectively, with a batch size of 64. To create
an updated ML model, we perform a single-epoch training.
Finally, we use balanced datasets in terms of label distribu-
tion over all classes to update the target model as well as the
shadow model. Therefore, we adopt accuracy to measure the
performance of the attack.
All of our experiments are implemented using Pytorch.6 For
reproducibility purposes, our code will be made available.
Results. The experimental results for our attack are depicted
in Figure 2. As we can see, ALI achieves a strong performance
with an accuracy of 0.96 on the CIFAR-10 dataset, and 0.68
on the MNIST dataset. Moreover, our attack significantly
outperforms the baseline model which simply guesses a label
over all possible labels. As both datasets contain 10 classes, the
baseline model’s result is approximately 10%. Our evaluation
shows that the different outputs of an ML model’s two versions
indeed leak information of the corresponding updating set.
B. Single-sample Reconstruction Attack
Attack Definition. Our next attack, i.e., single-sample re-
construction attack, takes one step further to construct the
data sample used to update the model. Formally, given a
posterior difference δ, the attack, denoted by ASSR, is defined
as follows:
ASSR : δ 7→ xupdate
where xupdate denotes the sample used to update the model
(Dupdate = {xupdate}).
Methodology. Reconstructing a data sample is a much more
complex task than predicting the sample’s label. To tackle this







Fig. 3: Methodology of the single-sample reconstruction attack
(ASSR).
data sample in the complex space. To this end, we rely on
autoencoder (AE).
Autoencoder is assembled with an encoder and a decoder.
Different from our attacks, AE’s goal is to learn an efficient
encoding for a data sample: Its encoder encodes a sample into
a latent vector and its decoder tries to decode the latent vector
to reconstruct the same sample. This indicates AE’s decoder
itself is a data sample reconstructor. For our attack, we first
train an AE, then transfer the AE’s decoder to our attack model
as its pretrained decoder. Figure 3 provides an overview of the
attack methodology.








where max(2) denotes a max-pooling layer with a 2×2 ker-
nel, µAE is the latent vector output of the encoder. Moreover,
ki, si, and fi represent the kernel size, number of filters, and
number of units in the ith layer. Their concrete values depend
on the target dataset. We adopt ReLU as the activation function
for all layers and apply dropout after the first fully connected
layer for regularization.
For AE’s decoder, we use the following model architecture:
Autoencoder’s decoder architecture:











Here, ConvTranspose2d(k’,s’) denotes a 2-dimension
transposed convolution layer with kernel size k′ × k′ and s′
filters, and f ′i specifies the number of units in the ith fully
connected layer. We again use ReLU as the activation function
for all layers except for the last one where we adopt tanh.
We also apply dropout after the last fully connected layer for
regularization.
After the autoencoder is trained, the adversary takes its
decoder and appends it to her attack model’s encoder. To estab-
lish the link, the adversary adds an additional fully connected
layer to its encoder which transforms the dimensions of the
latent vector µ to the same dimension as µAE .
We divide the attack model training process into two phases.
In the first phase, the adversary uses her shadow dataset to train
an AE with the previously mentioned model architecture. In
the second phase, she follows the same procedure for single-
sample label inference attack to train her attack model. Note
that the decoder from AE here serves as a pretrained decoder,
this means it will be further trained together with the attack
model’s encoder. To train both autoencoder and our attack
model, we use mean squared error (MSE) as the loss function.
Our objective in detail is,
LMSE = ‖xˆupdate − xupdate‖22
where xˆupdate is our predicted data sample. We again adopt
ADAM as the optimizer.
Experimental Setup. We use the same experimental setup as
the previous attack (see Section IV-A) except for the evaluation
metric. In detail, we adopt MSE to measure our attack’s
performance instead of accuracy. We list the concrete values
for the AE’s encoder and decoder hyperparameters in Table II
in the Appendix.
We construct two baseline models, namely label-random
and random. Both of these baseline models take a random data
sample from the adversary’s shadow dataset. The difference
is the label-random baseline picks a sample within the same
class as the target updating sample, while the random baseline
takes a random data sample from the whole shadow dataset of
the adversary. The label-random baseline can be implemented
by first performing our single-sample label inference attack to
learn the label of the data sample and then picking a random
sample affiliated with the same label.
Results. First of all, our single-sample reconstruction attack
achieves very strong performance. As shown in Figure 4,




















































Fig. 4: [Lower is better] Performance of the single-sample
reconstruction attack (ASSR) together with autoencoder and
two baseline models. Mean squared error is adopted as the
evaluation metric. Autoencoder serves as an oracle as the
adversary cannot use it for her attack.
Fig. 5: Visualization of some generated samples from the
single-sample reconstruction attack (ASSR) on the MNIST
dataset. Samples are fair random draws, not cherry-picked.
The first row shows the original samples. The second row
shows the reconstructed samples by ASSR. The third shows
row the reconstructed samples by autoencoder, i.e., the upper
bound of our reconstruction attack.
baseline by 36% and more importantly, outperforms the label-
random baseline by 22%. Similarly, for the CIFAR-10 dataset,
our attack achieves an MSE of 0.014 which is significantly
better than the two baseline models, i.e., it outperforms the
random and label-random baselines by a factor of 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively. The difference between our attack’s performance
gain over the baseline models on the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets is expected as images in CIFAR-10 are more complex
than those in MNIST. In other words, the chance of picking a
random image similar to the updating image is much higher
in the MNIST dataset than in the CIFAR-10 dataset
Secondly, we compare our attack’s performance against the
results of the autoencoder for sample reconstruction. Note that
AE which takes the original data sample as input and outputs
the reconstructed one is an oracle as the adversary does not
have access to the original updating sample. Here, we just
use AE’s result to show the best possible result for our attack.
From Figure 4, we observe that AE achieves 0.042 and 0.0043
MSE for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively,
which indeed outperforms our attack. However, our attack still
has a comparable performance.
Finally, Figure 5 visualizes some randomly sampled recon-
structed images by our attack on the MNIST dataset. The first
row depicts the original images used to update the models
and the second row shows the result of our attack. As we can
see, our attack is able to reconstruct images that are visually
similar to the original sample with respect to rotation and
shape. We also show the result of AE in the third row in
Figure 5 which as mentioned before, is the upper bound for
our attack. The results from Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate
that our attack indeed learns to construct the specific updating
data sample instead of a general representation of samples
affiliated with the same label as the target updating sample.
This follows the security and privacy definition presented in
previous works [20], [31].
V. MULTI-SAMPLE ATTACKS
After demonstrating the effectiveness of our attacks against
the updating set with a single sample, we now focus on a
more general attack scenario where the updating set contains
multiple data samples. We introduce two attacks in the multi-
sample attack class: Multi-sample label distribution estimation
attack and multi-sample reconstruction attack.
A. Multi-sample Label Distribution Estimation Attack
Attack Definition. Our first attack in the multi-label attack
class aims at estimating the label distribution of the updating
set’s samples. It can be considered as a generalization of
the label inference attack in the single-sample attack class.
Formally, the attack is defined as:
ALDE : δ 7→ q
where q as a vector denotes the distribution of labels over all
classes for samples in the updating set.
Methodology. The adversary uses the same encoder structure
as presented in Section III-B and the same decoder structure
of the label inference attack (Section IV-A). However, since
the label distribution estimation attack estimates a probability
vector q instead of performing classification. We use Kullback-








where qˆ` and q` represent our attack’s estimated label distri-
bution and the target label distribution, respectively, and (q`)i
corresponds to the ith label.
To train the attack model ALDE , the adversary starts
by generating her training data as mentioned in Sec-
tion III-D. She then trains ALDE with the posterior dif-
ference δ1shadow · · · δmshadow as the input and the normalized
label distribution of their corresponding updating sets, i.e.,
Dupdate1shadow · · · Dupdate
m
shadow , as the output. We assume the adversary
knows the cardinality of the updating set. We try to relax this
assumption later in our evaluation.
Experimental Setup. We evaluate our label distribution esti-
mation attack using updating set of sizes 10 and 100. For the
7








































































Fig. 6: [Lower is better for (a) and (b), higher is better for (c) and (d)] Performance of the multi-sample label distribution
estimation attack (ALDE ) together with the baseline model and transfer attack. KL-divergence and accuracy are adopted as
the evaluation metric. Accuracy here is used to measure the prediction of the most frequent label over samples in the updating
set. (10) and (100) mean the target updating set contains 10 and 100 data samples, respectively. Transfer 10-100 means each
of the training sample for the attack model corresponds to an updating set containing 10 data samples and each of the testing
sample for the attack model corresponds to an updating set containing 100 data samples.
two different sizes, we build attack models as mentioned in
the methodology. All data samples in each updating set for the
shadow and target models are sampled uniformly, thus each
sample (in both training and testing set) for the attack model
has an uniform label distribution. We use a batch size of 64
when updating the models.
For evaluation metrics, we calculate KL-divergence for each
testing sample (corresponding to an updating set on the target
model) and report the average result over all testing samples
(1,000 in total). Besides, we also measure the accuracy of
predicting the most frequent label over samples in the updating
set. We randomly sample a dataset with the same size as
the updating set and use its samples’ label distribution as the
baseline.
Results. We report the result for our label distribution es-
timation attack in Figure 6. As shown, ALDE achieves a
significantly better performance than the baseline model on
both datasets. For the updating set with 100 data samples
on the CIFAR-10 dataset, our attack achieves 3 and 1.5
times better accuracy and KL-divergence, respectively, than
the baseline model. Similarly, for the MNIST dataset, our
attack also achieves 1.8 times better accuracy and 2 times
better KL-divergence. Furthermore, ALDE achieves a similar
improvement over the baseline model for the updating set of
size 10.
Recall that the adversary is assumed to know the cardinality
of the updating set in order to train her attack model, we
further test whether we can relax this assumption. To this
end, we first update the shadow model with 100 samples
while updating the target model with 10 samples. As shown
in Figure 6a and Figure 6c Transfer 100-10, our attack still
has a similar performance as the original attack. However,
when the adversary updates her shadow model with 10 data





Fig. 7: Methodology of the multi-sample reconstruction attack
(AMSR).
samples (Figure 6b and Figure 6d Transfer 10-100), our
attack performance drops significantly, in particular for KL-
divergence on the CIFAR-10 dataset. This is expected as 10
samples does not provide enough information for the attack
model to generalize to a larger updating set.
B. Multi-sample Reconstruction Attack
Attack Definition. Our last attack, namely multi-sample re-
construction attack, aims at reconstructing the updating set.
This attack can be considered as a generalization of the single-
sample reconstruction attack, and a step towards the goal of
reconstructing the training set of a black-box ML model.
Formally, the multi-sample reconstruction attack is defined
as follows:
AMSR : δ 7→ Dupdate
where Dupdate = {x1update , . . . , x|Dupdate |update } contains the sam-
ples used to update the model.
Methodology. The complexity of the task for reconstructing
an updating set increases significantly when the updating
set size grows from one to multiple. Our previous single-
sample reconstruction attack (Section IV-B) uses autoencoder
to reconstruct a single sample. However, AE cannot generate
a set of samples.
Generative Adversarial Networks. Samples from a dataset,
e.g., Dupdate , are essentially samples drawn from a complex
data distribution. If an adversary is able to learn the data
distribution of Dupdate , then she is able to generate multiple
samples with the distribution which is equivalent to recon-
struct Dupdate . In this work, we leverage the state-of-the-
art generative model, namely generative adversarial networks
(GANs) [9], the effectiveness of which has been demonstrated
on learning image data distributions.
A GAN consists of a pair of ML models: a generator (G)
and a discriminator (D). The generator G learns to transform
a Gaussian noise vector z ∼ N (0, 1) to a data sample xˆ,
G : z 7→ xˆ
such that the generated sample xˆ is indistinguishable from
a true data sample. This is enabled by the discriminator D
which is jointly trained. The generator G tries to fool the
discriminator, which is trained to distinguish between samples
from the Generator (G) and true data samples. The objective
function maximized by GAN’s discriminator D is,
LD = Ex∈Dupdate log(D(x)) + Exˆ log(1− D(xˆ)) (1)
Thus, the GAN discriminator D is trained to output 1 (“true”)
for real data and 0 (“false”) for fake data. On the other hand,
the generator G maximizes:
LG = Exˆ log(D(xˆ))
Thus, G is trained to produce samples xˆ = G(z) that are
classified as “true” (real) by D.
However, the goal of our attack is to reconstruct Dupdate for
any given posterior difference δ, which the standard GAN does
not support. Therefore, we propose a novel hybrid generative
model, referred to as BM-GAN, which conditions its generated
samples xˆ on δ.
BM-GAN. The decoder of our attack model is casted as our
BM-GAN’s generator (G). To enable this, we concatenate the
noise vector z and the latent vector µ produced by our attack
model’s encoder (with posterior different as input), and use it
as BM-GAN’s generator’s input, as in Conditional GANs [21].
This allows our decoder to map the posterior difference δ to
samples in Dupdate .
However, Conditional GANs are severely prone to mode
collapse [2], [39]. To deal with this, we introduce a reconstruc-
tion cost. This reconstruction cost forces our GAN to cover
all the modes of the distribution (set) of data samples used
to update the model. However, it is unclear, given a posterior
difference δ and a noise vector z pair, which point in the
data distribution we should force BM-GAN to reconstruct.
Therefore, we allow our GAN full flexibility in learning a
mapping from posterior difference and noise vector z pairs
to data samples – this means we allow it to choose the data
sample to reconstruct. We realize this using a novel “Best










where xˆ ∼ G represents samples produced by our BM-GAN
given a latent vector µ and noise sample z. The first part of the
LBM objective is based on the standard MSE reconstruction
cost and forces our BM-GAN to reconstruct all samples in
Dupdate as the error is summed across x ∈ Dupdate . However,
unlike the standard MSE reconstruction cost, given a data
sample x ∈ Dupdate , the cost is based only on the generated
sample xˆ which is closest to the data sample x ∈ Dupdate . This
allows BM-GAN to reconstruct samples in Dupdate without
having an explicit mapping from posterior difference and noise
vector z pairs to data samples, as only the “Best Match” is
penalized. Finally, the discriminator D ensures that the samples
xˆ are indistinguishable from the “true” samples of Dupdate .
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Figure 7 presents a schematic view of our multi-sample
reconstruction attack’s methodology. The concrete architecture
of BM-GAN’s generator and discriminator for the two datasets
used in this paper are listed as the following.
BM-GAN’s generator architecture for MNIST:




BM-GAN’s discriminator architecture for MNIST:





BM-GAN’s generator architecture for CIFAR-10:





BM-GAN’s discriminator architecture for CIFAR-10:






Here, for both generators and discriminators, Sigmoid is the
Sigmoid function, batch normalization is applied on the output
of each layer except the last layer, and LeakyReLU is used as
the activation function for all layers except the last one, which
uses tanh.
Training of BM-GAN. The training of the attack model AMSR
is more complicated than previous attacks, hence we provide
more details here. Similar to the previous attacks, the adversary
starts the training by generating the training data as mentioned
in Section III-D. She then jointly trains her encoder and BM-
GAN with the posterior difference δ1shadow · · · δmshadow as the
inputs and samples inside their corresponding updating sets,
i.e., Dupdate1shadow · · · Dupdate
m
shadow as the output. More concretely,
for each posterior difference δishadow , she updates her attack
model AMSR as follows:
1) The adversary sends the posterior difference δishadow to
her encoder to get the latent vector µi.
2) She then generates |Dupdateishadow | noise vectors.
3) To create the BM-GAN’s generator input, she concate-
nates each of the noise vectors with the latent vector
µi.
4) On the input of the concatenated vectors, the BM-
GAN generates |Dupdateishadow | samples, i.e., each vector
corresponds to each sample.
5) The adversary then calculates the generator loss as
introduced by Equation 2, and uses it to update the
generator and the encoder.
6) Finally, she calculates and updates the BM-GAN’s dis-
criminator according to the loss function introduced in
Equation 1.
As before, all the optimization is performed by the ADAM
optimizer.
Clustering. BM-GAN only provides a generator which learns
the distribution of the samples in the updating set. However,
to reconstruct the exact data samples in Dupdate , we need a
final step assisted by machine learning clustering. In detail, we
assume the adversary knows the cardinality of Dupdate as in
Section V-A. After BM-GAN is trained, the adversary utilizes
BM-GAN’s generator to generate a large number of samples.
She then clusters the generated samples into |Dupdate | clusters.
Here, the K-means algorithm is adopted to perform clustering
where we set K to |Dupdate |. In the end, for each cluster, the
adversary calculates its centroid, and takes the nearest sample
to the centroid as one reconstructed sample.
Experimental Setup. We evaluate the multi-sample recon-
struction attack on the updating set of size 100 and generate
20,000 images for each updating set reconstruction with BM-
GAN. For the rest of the experimental settings, we follow the
one mentioned in Section V-A except for evaluation metrics
and baseline.
We use MSE between the updating and reconstructed data
samples to measure the multi-sample reconstruction attack’s
performance. For the baseline model of this attack, we perform
K-means clustering on the adversary’s shadow dataset. More
concretely, we cluster the adversary’s shadow dataset into 100
clusters and take the nearest sample to the centroid of each
cluster as one reconstructed sample.
Results. In Figure 8, we first present some visualization of
the intermediate result of our attack, i.e., the BM-GAN’s
output before clustering, on the CIFAR-10 dataset. For each
randomly sampled image in the updating set, we show the 5
nearest reconstructed images with respect to MSE generated
by BM-GAN. As we can see, our attack model generates
images with similar characteristics to the original images. For
instance, the 5 reconstructed images for the airplane image in
Figure 8b all show a blue background and a blurry version of




Fig. 8: Visualization of some generated samples from the multi-sample reconstruction attack (AMSR) before clustering on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. Samples are fair random draws, not cherry-picked. The left column shows the original samples and the
next 5 columns show the 5 nearest reconstructed samples with respect to mean squared error.
boat image in Figure 8a, the car image in Figure 8c, and the
boat image in Figure 8d. It is also interesting to see that BM-
GAN provides different samples for the two different horse
images in Figure 8b. The blurriness in the results is expected,
due to the complex nature of the CIFAR-10 dataset and the
weak assumptions for our adversary, i.e., access to black-box
ML model.
We also quantitatively measure the performance of our
intermediate results, by calculating the MSE between each
image in the updating set and its nearest reconstructed sample.
We refer to this as one-to-one match. Figure 10 shows for
the CIFAR-10 dataset, we achieve 0.0283 MSE, and for the
MNIST dataset, we achieve 0.043. It is important to note that
the adversary cannot perform one-to-one match as she does
not have access to ground truth samples in the updating set,
i.e., one-to-one match is an oracle.
Figure 10 shows the mean squared error of our full attack
with clustering for both CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets.
To match each of our reconstructed samples to a sample
in Dupdate , we rely on the Hungarian algorithm [16]. This
guarantees that each reconstructed sample is only matched
with one ground truth sample in Dupdate and vice versa. As
we can see, our attack outperforms the baseline model on
both datasets by 20% and 22%, respectively. In detail, our
attack achieves an MSE of 0.036 on the CIFAR-10 dataset
and 0.051 on the MNIST dataset. As expected, the result of
our final attack is lower than one-to-one match, i.e., the above
mentioned intermediate results.
We further visualize our full attack’s result on the MNIST
dataset. Figure 9 shows a sample of a full MNIST updating
set reconstruction, i.e., the BM-GAN’s reconstructed images
for the 100 original images in an updating set. We observe
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Fig. 9: Visualization of a full MNIST updating set together with the output of the multi-sample reconstruction attack (AMSR)
after clustering. Samples are fair random draws, not cherry-picked. The left column shows the original samples and the right


























Fig. 10: [Lower is better] Performance of the multi-sample
reconstruction attack (AMSR) together with one-to-one match
and the baseline model. Mean squared error (MSE) is adopted
as the evaluation metric. The match between the original
and reconstructed samples is performed by the Hungarian
algorithm for both AMSR and the baseline model. One-to-
one match serves as an oracle as the adversary cannot use it
for her attack.
that our attack model reconstructs diverse digits of each class
that for most of the cases match the actual ground truth data
very well. This suggests BM-GAN is able to capture all modes
in a data distribution well. Only in limited cases, our attack
does not provide a perfect reconstruction, e.g., the digit “3”
in the first image of Figure 9 is reconstructed to “8”. One
limitation of our attack is that BM-GAN’s sample generation
and clustering are performed separately. In the future, we plan
to combine them to perform an end-to-end training which may
further boost our attack’s performance.
From all these results, we show that our attack in the most
difficult setting still does not generate a general representation
of data samples affiliated with the same label, but reconstructs
the specific images inside the updating set.
VI. POSSIBLE DEFENSES
Our attacks make the first attempt to explore a new attack
surface against black-box ML models. Extensive experimental
results have demonstrated their effectiveness. In this section,
we discuss two possible defense mechanisms in order to
mitigate the threat.
Adding Noise to Posteriors. All our attacks leverage posterior
difference as the input. Therefore, to reduce our attacks’
performance, one could sanitize posterior difference. However,
the model owner cannot directly manipulate the posterior
difference, as she does not know with what or when the
adversary probes her model. Therefore, she has to add noise to
the posterior for each queried sample independently. We have
tried adding noise sampled from an uniform distribution to
the posteriors. Experimental results show that the performance
for some of our attacks indeed drops to a certain degree.
For instance, the single-sample label inference attack on the
CIFAR-10 dataset drops by 17% in accuracy. However, the
performance of our multi-sample reconstruction attack stays
stable. One reason might be the noise vector z is part of BM-
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GAN’s input which makes the attack model more robust to
the noise input.
Differential Privacy. Another possible defense mechanism
against our attacks is differentially private learning. Differ-
ential privacy [5] can help an ML model learn its main
tasks while reducing its memory on the training data. If
differentially private learning schemes [1], [4], [30] are used
when updating the target ML model, this by design will reduce
the performance of our attacks. However, it is also important to
mention that depending on the privacy budget for differential
privacy, the utility of the model can drop significantly.
We leave an in-depth exploration of effective defense mech-
anisms against our attacks as a future work.
VII. RELATED WORKS
Membership Inference. Membership inference aims at deter-
mining whether a data sample is inside a dataset. It has been
successfully performed in various settings such as biomedical
data [11], [14] and location data [27], [28]. Shokri et al. [31]
propose the first membership inference attack against machine
learning models. In this attack, an adversary’s goal is to
determine whether a data sample is in the training set of a
black-box ML model. To mount this attack, the adversary
relies on a binary machine learning classifier which is trained
with the data derived from shadow models (similar to our
attacks). More recently, multiple membership inference attacks
have been proposed with new attacking techniques or targeting
on different types of ML models [12], [18], [19], [22], [23],
[29], [33], [40].
In theory, membership inference attack can be used to
reconstruct the dataset, similar to our reconstruction attacks.
However, it is not scalable in the real-world setting as the
adversary needs to obtain a large-scale dataset which includes
all samples in the target model’s training set. Though our two
reconstruction attacks are designed specifically for the online
learning setting, we believe the underlying techniques we
propose, i.e., pretrained decoder from a standard autoencoder
and BM-GAN, can be further extended to reconstruct datasets
from black-box ML models in other settings.
Model Inversion. Fredrikson et al. [7] propose model in-
version attack first on biomedical data. The goal of model
inversion is to infer some missing attributes of an input feature
vector based on the interaction with a trained ML model.
Later, other works generalize the model inversion attack to
other settings, for instance, to reconstruct recognizable human
faces [6], [13]. As pointed out by other works [20], [31], model
inversion attack reconstructs a general representation of data
samples affiliated with certain labels, while our reconstruction
attacks target on specific data samples used in the updating
set.
Model Stealing. Another related line of work is model
stealing. Trame`r et al. [36] are among the first to introduce
the model stealing attack against black-box ML models. In
this attack, an adversary tries to learn the target ML model’s
parameters. Trame`r et al. propose various attacking techniques
including equation-solving and decision tree path-finding. The
former has been demonstrated to be effective on simple ML
models, such as logistic regression, while the latter is designed
specifically for decision trees, a class of machine learning
classifiers. Moreover, relying on an active learning based
retraining strategy, the authors show that it is possible to steal
an ML model even if the model only provides the label instead
of posteriors as the output. More recently, Orekondy et al. [25]
propose a more advanced attack on stealing the target model’s
functionality and show that their attack is able to replicate
a mature commercial machine learning API. In addition to
model parameters, several works concentrate on stealing ML
models’ hyperparameters [24], [38].
Besides the above, there exist a wide range of other attacks
and defenses on machine learning models [1], [3], [4], [8],
[10], [15], [17], [26], [32], [34], [35], [37].
VIII. CONCLUSION
Large-scale data being generated at every second turns ML
model training into a continuous process. In consequence,
a machine learning model queried with a same set of data
samples at two different time points will provide different
results. In this paper, we investigate whether these different
model outputs can constitutes a new attack surface for an
adversary to infer information of the dataset used to perform
model update.
We propose four different attacks in this surface all of
which follow a general encoder-decoder structure. The encoder
encodes the difference in the target model’s output before and
after being updated, and the decoder generates different types
of information regarding the updating set.
We start by exploring a simplified case when a black-box
ML model is only updated with one single data sample. We
propose two different attacks for this setting, The first attack
shows that the label of the single updating sample can be
effectively inferred (0.96 accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset).
The second attack utilizes an autoencoder’s decoder as the
attack model’s pretrained decoder and accurately reconstructs
the single updating sample.
We then generalize our attacks to the case when the updating
set contains multiple samples. Our multi-sample label distri-
bution estimation attack trained following a KL-divergence
loss is able to infer the label distribution of the updating
set’s data samples effectively. For our last and the the most
complex attack – the multiple-sample reconstruction attack, we
propose a novel hybrid generative model, namely BM-GAN,
which uses a ”Best Matching” loss in its objective function.
The “Best Matching” loss directs BM-GAN’s generator to
reconstruct each sample in the updating set. Quantitative and
qualitative results show that we are able to reconstruct the
updating dataset in challenging scenarios. To the best of our
knowledge, this constitutes the first attack of this type, which
is able to infer very detailed information on the dataset and
even lends itself to full reconstruction of the data.
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APPENDIX








f ′1 15 50
f ′2 32 64
k′1 3 3
s′1 16 32
k′2 5 5
s′2 8 16
k′3 2 4
s′3 1 3
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